Детерминанты заработной платы сотрудников российских вузов в условиях эффективного контракта
Аннотация
Проведено исследование с целью оценить влияние показателей научной, преподавательской и административной работы на заработную плату профессорско-преподавательского состава в зависимости от статуса вуза и от того, в каком регионе он находится. Для проверки гипотезы о различии детерминант заработных плат сотрудников в разных университетах используются данные Мониторинга экономики образования за 2022 г. Результаты оценки эконометрических моделей заработных плат профессорско-преподавательского состава на основе модификации уравнения Минцера показывают, что действующую систему эффективных контрактов в российском академическом секторе нельзя считать успешной в стимулировании научной деятельности, так как индикаторы публикационной активности не оказывают статистически значимого эффекта на доходы преподавателей и исследователей. С наиболее высокой заработной платой в вузах оказались связаны такие показатели, как административная нагрузка, статус вуза и его территориальное расположение. Для создания в вузах действенных стимулов к повышению у профессорско-преподавательского состава мотивации заниматься научной деятельностью важно включать в структуру эффективных контрактов индикаторы публикационной активности с учетом качества статей. Для сокращения неравенства в доходах университеты могут продвигать получение более высоких ученых степеней и PhD, так как эти показатели научной работы статистически значимо влияют на заработные платы. Полученные результаты важны как для университетов, определяющих структуру эффективных контрактов, так и для государственных органов управления в сфере науки и высшего образования России.
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Литература
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